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JOINT AUTHORSHIP
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE:
LEVY V. RUTLEY AND DIVERGENCE BETWEEN
THE UK AND USA
by ELENA COOPER*
Recent scholarship has pointed to the diversity of copyright, and in-
tellectual property laws more generally, in the common law world.  In the
place of a picture of convergence and uniformity, in The Common Law of
Intellectual Property, Catherine Ng, Lionel Bently and Giuseppina
D’Agostino argue that the “commonality” of intellectual property laws in
common law jurisdictions has “latterly . . . become increasingly fractured.”
As they observe, drawing together a series of essays, the cumulative effect
of diversity in many aspects of intellectual property law supports the “the-
sis of growing divergence in the approaches taken by the courts and legis-
latures of various common law countries”; the result is “a strong case that
the approaches taken in the common law countries are anything but
common.”1
A copyright doctrine left unconsidered by The Common Law of Intel-
lectual Property is joint authorship.  A number of developments in this
area point to legal variation across common law jurisdictions in recent
times.2  Amongst these are judicial decisions in the UK and the U.S.,
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1 CATHERINE W. NG, LIONEL BENTLY & GIUSEPPINA D’AGOSTINO, THE COM-
MON LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFES-
SOR DAVID VAVER 4, 5, (2010).
2 Differences between the UK and U.S. approaches, both in terms of legislative
tests and decided case law, are outlined in the passage that follows.  Varia-
tion is also evident in the approaches adopted by common law countries,
such as the UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, that have the same or
closely similar statutory definitions of joint authorship: all adopt the statu-
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tory definition set out at the text to note 3 infra, save for Australia that
substitutes “not separate” for “not distinct” (as was the case under UK
Copyright Act 1956 s. 11(1), the predecessor to the current UK 1988 Act).
See UK Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 s. 10(1); New Zealand
Copyright Act 1994 s. 6(1); Canadian Copyright Act 1985 s. 2; Australian
Copyright Act 1968 s. 10(1)).  For example, in the late 1990s the UK courts
developed tests relating to the nature of the joint author’s contribution, into
a requirement for the “right kind of skill and labor.” See Fylde Microsys.,
Ltd. v. Key Radio Sys., Ltd., [1998] FSR 449, 456, 457 (denying joint author
status to those who contributed to error correction tasks to computer
software); Hadley v. Kemp, [1999] EMLR 589, 643, 646 (interpretation and
performance of musical works); Brighton v. Jones, [2005] FSR 16, ¶¶ 34(ii),
56(iii) (theatrical presentation of dramatic works). While an approach such
as this might have been drawn on by the New Zealand Court of Appeal, in
the leading New Zealand case of Land Transport Safety Authority of New
Zealand v. Glogau, [1999] 1 NZLR 261, the Court instead decided the case
(which concerned whether employees of the Land Transport Safety Author-
ity were joint authors of safety logbooks for taxi drivers as a result of their
employees’ contributions in discussing drafts during the course of statutory
approval) on the basis of a lack of “collaboration,” not the nature of the
contribution: collaboration required “two, or a team, setting out to write a
joint production,” which did not occur in “a statutory approval situation.”
Id. at 271. Cf. Hadley, [1999] EMLR at 644 (Park, J.) (UK case that pro-
ceeded on the basis that “collaboration” was not in issue — that case could
have been decided on the basis that all the members of Spandau Ballet were
not joint authors of the musical works because the rehearsals did not in-
volve, to use the New Zealand test, “two, or a team, setting out to write a
joint production”).  While this may just reflect a different emphasis, other
variations are more striking.  For example, in the UK, tests of “intention”
have been unanimously rejected (see Beckingham v. Hodgens, [2003]
EWCA Civ 143, ¶ 11-12 (approving of the approach of Queen’s Counsel
Floyd at first instance, [2002] EWHC 2143, ¶ 43)).  In contrast, the New
Zealand Court of Appeal considered intention to inform the requirement of
“collaboration.” See Glogau, [1999] 1 NZLR at 272.  A test of intention has
also received some support in Canada (see Neudorf v. Nettwork Expres-
sions, [2000] RPC 935 (S. Ct. N.B.)), and while a subsequent ruling upheld
by the Federal Court of Appeal did not follow this approach (see
Neugebauer v. Labieniec, (2009) FC 666, allowed in part and dismissed in
part, (2010) FCA 229)) some subsequent cases and commentary have re-
ferred to both approaches, suggesting that the test of “intention” may be
applied in some Canadian cases. See, e.g., Waldman v. Thomson Reuters
Corp., (2012) ONSC 1138, ¶ 72; HALSBURY’S LAWS OF CANADA 106 (R.T.
Hughes & S.J. Peacock eds., 2011)).  As regards Australia, an example of a
contrast to the UK is that the courts frequently tie a finding that there was
no “collaboration” to the conclusion that contributions were “separate” on
the basis that contributors exercised “individual intellectual effort.” See,
e.g., Primary Healthcare, Ltd. v, Federal Comm’r of Taxation, [2010] FCA
419, ¶ 121-122 (concerning patient records completed by doctors); Acohs
Pty., Ltd. v. Ucorp, Pty., Ltd., [2010] FCA 577, ¶¶ 57-59, approved, [2012]
FCAFC 16, ¶ 86 (concerning the role of computer programmers and trans-
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CPY\62-2\CPY202.txt unknown Seq: 3 13-JUL-15 16:08
Divergence Between the UK and USA 247
which have served further to entrench differences in approaches to joint
authorship contained in the statutory tests.  The statutory definition of
joint authorship in the UK is “a work produced by the collaboration of
two or more authors in which the contribution of each author is not dis-
tinct from that of the other author or authors.”3 In the U.S. it is: “a work
prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contribu-
tions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole.”4  Whereas certain statements made in the U.S. legislative process
suggested that “collaboration” (a component of the UK test5 which does
not appear in the US statute) might be an alternative to intention to merge
into a unitary whole, in a number of decisions the Second Circuit District
Court has made clear that this is not the case, with “intention to merge”
being a requirement in all cases.6
cribers of data in compiling the source code for electronic information
sheets).  By contrast in Beckingham, [2003] EWCA Civ 143, ¶ 46 (Floyd,
Q.C.), the criterion that contributions are “not separate” concerned the
question of how the contribution related to the rest of the finished work,
rather than whether it stemmed from effort that was individual not collabo-
rative; see also Hadley, [1999] EMLR at 650.  The differences in interpreta-
tion of the criterion of “not separate” may result, in particular, in
differences in the application of joint authorship to large-scale collabora-
tions: in Australia, the interpretation of “not separate” by reference to the
process of creating the work, rather than the significance of the contribu-
tions to the final work (as in the UK case of Beckingham), has been used as
a judicial technique to limit the application of joint authorship to large scale
collaborations, in which different groups of contributors may be oblivious to
the function performed by other contributors. See Telstra Corp. v. Phone
Directories, Pty., Ltd., [2010] FCA 44, ¶ 337; [2010] FCAFC 149, ¶ 92,
where the Federal Court of Australia, Full Court, upheld the first instance
the judgment of Judge Gordon that the white and yellow pages telephone
directories were not works of joint authorship, in part because the various
groups of individuals involved in the process did not collaborate, being una-
ware of the functions which each performed separately.
3 UK Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 s. 10(1).
4 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). This is framed as a definition of a “joint work.”  How-
ever, as acknowledged by judicial statement, “this definition is really the
definition of a work of joint authorship.”  Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500,
505 (2d Cir. 1991).
5 The UK Court of Appeal has approved an approach to joint authorship that
involves an enquiry into three elements: collaboration, the nature of the
contribution and the requirement that each contribution is not distinct.
Beckingham, [2003] EWCA Civ 143, ¶¶ 11-12 (approving of the approach
of Queen’s Counsel Floyd at first instance in Beckingham, [2003] EWCA
Civ 143, ¶ 43).
6 Childress, 945 F.2d 500.  On this point, the court was following Weissmann v.
Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1317-19 (2d Cir.1989).  Legislative discussion of
this provision appeared to envisage two alternative criteria: collaboration or
intention to merge into a whole. In Weissmann, 868 F.2d at 1317-19, and
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Further, the decision that reflects the current U.S. majority view, the
U.S. Second Circuit District Court in Childress v. Taylor,7 sets down two
further requirements that again distance the U.S. approach from that in
the UK.  First, each joint author’s contribution must be “independently
copyrightable” such that if someone contributes a “non-copyrightable
idea” and another the “copyrightable form of expression,” the contributor
of the idea will not be a joint author.8  This contrasts to certain case law in
the UK: in looking for a contribution to the skill and labor protected by
copyright,9 rather than the higher hurdle that the contribution is indepen-
dently copyrightable, certain UK decisions have been more flexible in ac-
cepting co-authorship status for the contributors of ideas.10  Secondly, the
ruling in Childress requires “intention as to co-authorship,”11 and in Beck-
ingham v. Hodgens the UK Court of Appeal unanimously ruled that there
Childress, 945 F.2d at 505-06, the Second Circuit made clear that the statu-
tory test was to be interpreted literally.
7 Childress, 945 F.2d 500; Eric J. Schwartz & David Nimmer, United States of
America, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 4[1][a][i]
(Paul E. Geller ed., 2011).
8 Childress, 945 F.2d at 506. Subsequent decisions have explained this to mean
that the contribution must amount to an “original expression that could
stand on its own as subject matter of copyright.” See Erickson v. Trinity
Theatre, 13 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 1994), ¶ 46 (quoting PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COP-
YRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.2.1.2, at 379 (1989)). But see
Weissman, 868 F.2d 1313 (focusing on collaboration).
9 The impact of the dicta of the European Court of Justice in defining “original-
ity” as “own intellectual creation” is yet to be seen in joint authorship case
law. See Infopaq Int’l, A/S  v. Danske Dagblades Forening, Case C-5/08,
[2009] ECR I-6569; see also infra, note 129.
10 See, e.g, Cala Homes (South), Ltd. v. Alfred McAlpine Homes, Ltd., [1995]
FSR 818, 835 (Laddie, J.) (“In my view, to have regard merely to who
pushed the pen is too narrow a view of authorship.  What is protected by
copyright in a drawing or a literary work is more than just the skill of mak-
ing marks on paper or some other medium. It is both the words or lines and
the skill and effort involved in creating, selecting or gathering together the
detailed concepts, data or emotions which those words or lines have fixed in
some tangible form which is protected.”).  Note however, that in Robin Ray
v. Classic FM, Plc., [1998] FSR 622, 636, Justice Lightman said he consid-
ered Cala to be an “exceptional” case, involving “very detailed input given
by the joint author that did not exercise penmanship” and concluding that
“what is required is something which approximates to penmanship.” See
also Donaghue v. Allied Newspapers, Ltd., [1938] Ch. 106, 109 (though a
claim for joint authorship was not advanced in that case).
11 Childress, 945 F.2d  at 507. This takes the requirement of intention beyond that
indicated by the statutory language (confined to the merger of the contribu-
tions into a unitary whole). See the wording of 17 U.S.C. § 101 n.4 (2012).
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was “no basis” for “importing” such a requirement from inter alia U.S.
jurisprudence, expressly refusing to follow Childress.12
Despite these differences, the courts in both the UK and the U.S.
claim joint authorship to have a common historical lineage: the late nine-
teenth century English case of Levy v. Rutley.13  In Childress, the Second
Circuit District Court acknowledged Levy to be “the first definition of
“‘joint authorship’”14 and in the UK, Levy is still cited in some legal judg-
ments as regards the substance of the joint authorship test.15  This com-
mon origin might suggest that the “fracture” of UK and U.S. approaches
to joint authorship occurred only in recent times.  The central contention
of this article is that it is not: despite Levy being the common root of joint
authorship in both jurisdictions, the story of difference has a longer
history.
In this way, the comparative historical research contained in this pa-
per presents a nuanced picture about the influence of common law juris-
dictions on the national laws of one another.  On the one hand, it further
supports the “provocative thought” entertained in the postscript to The
Common Law of Intellectual Property: that intellectual property in com-
mon law countries has long been characterized by divergence.16  On the
other, the very fact that the U.S. sought to draw on English nineteenth-
century authorities as late as the early twentieth century, suggests that this
is an area that defies one of the most obvious explanations that existing
literature has put forward to account for difference in common law ap-
proaches: the throwing off of “old legal chains” by former colonies that
had become independent.17  Indeed, as we will see, the roots for the emer-
gence of divergence lie with a U.S. decision that read Levy in conjunction
with another English authority (Hatton v. Kean), at variance to its inter-
pretation by English courts.  In explaining these differences and others in
UK and U.S. approaches, which stem from the development of dicta from
12 Beckingham v. Hodgens, [2003] EWCA Civ 143, ¶ 52-53 (Parker, L.J.), af-
firming [2002] EWHC 2143, ¶ 48 (Floyd, Q.C.).
13 (1870–71) L.R. 6 C.P. 523.
14 Childress, 945 F.2d at 504.
15 See, e.g., Beckingham, [2003] EWCA Civ 143, ¶ 44 (Floyd, Q.C.) (drawing on
Levy to inform the requirement of “collaboration”). See also the language
of “common design” in Godfrey v. Lees, [1995] EMLR 307, 325.  In addi-
tion, certain dicta on the nature of the contribution may be informed by
Levy. For example, in Godfrey, Judge Blackburne accepted that there was
no need for each joint author to contribute equally to the work, which was
also a point decided in Levy.
16 See NG, BENTLY & D’AGOSTINO, supra note 1, 401-21.
17 See id. at 6 (quoting the contribution of Lior Zemer in the same volume: Lior
Zemer, The Emancipation of Fair Use in Israel in THE COMMON LAW OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 1, 281-304, 284).
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common authorities, this article looks to broader differences in social and
cultural contexts (e.g., the theatre and literature in the UK and popular
music in the U.S.) and other variations in national copyright rules, which
provided distinct parameters within which the implications of joint author-
ship were debated and considered in the two jurisdictions.
With these comments in mind, this article proceeds as follows: starting
with the ruling in Levy and other nineteenth-century disputes about au-
thorship and ownership (Section I), it explains how and why differences
emerged between UK and US approaches to joint authorship during the
course of the twentieth century (Sections II and III). The article concludes
(in Section IV) with comments about how the comparative history of joint
authorship contributes to a broader picture of historical diversity in copy-
right in the common law world, an observation of relevance both to copy-
right scholarship and policy-making in recent times.
I. COMMON ORIGINS: LEVY V. RUTLEY AND EARLY
DISPUTES OVER AUTHORSHIP
Levy v. Rutley, decided in 1871 by the Court of Common Pleas, was
one of a number of cases brought under the Dramatic Literary Property
Act 183318 by theatre managers seeking to prevent rival theatres from put-
ting on plays written by dramatists they had “employed.” In these cases,
the courts were presented with competing claims as regards authorship
and/or first ownership between “employer” theatre managers on the one
hand and “employee” dramatists on the other.19  As this section shows,
18 The Dramatic Literary Property Act 1833 (3 & 4 Will. 4, c.15) provided protec-
tion for the performance of “any Tragedy, Comedy, Play, Opera, Farce, or
any other Dramatic Piece or Entertainment” at “any place or places of Dra-
matic Entertainment whatsoever” (at § 1). For more on the 1833 Act see
Ronan Deazley, Commentary on Dramatic Literary Property Act 1833, in
PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450–1900) (Lionel Bently & Martin
Kretschmer eds.), http://www.copyrighthistory.org (last visited Jan. 1, 2015);
Isabella Alexander, “Neither Bolt nor Chain, Iron Safe nor Private Watch-
man, Can Prevent the Theft of Words”: The Birth of the Performing Right in
Britain, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF COPY-
RIGHT (Ronan Deazley, Martin Kretschmer & Lionel Bently eds., 2010).
19 The cases describe the theatre managers as “employers” and their relation
with the dramatists as one of “employment.”  Yet, it should be noted that
the nineteenth-century meaning of these terms was different from their
meaning today. As Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson have shown, the
modern concept of the contract of employment did not emerge until the
twentieth century.  In the mid-nineteenth century, the term “employee” de-
noted wage-dependent labour of clerical, managerial or professional status.
The category “employee” was distinct from that of “servant,” the latter fall-
ing under the disciplinary regime of “master” and “servant” legislation
which was supported by the criminal jurisdiction of the magistrates’ courts.
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the decision in Levy, which favored the position of the latter, can be ex-
plained both by the wish not to undermine other case law prescribing the
circumstances in which the interests of “employer” theatre managers
would prevail, as well as policy implications relating to operation of copy-
right in the particular context of the theatre.
By the time Levy came to be heard, a number of disputes between
theatre managers and dramatists had been decided.  These established a
number of propositions.  First, it was clear that the “author” was the first
owner of copyright in a play: in Shepherd v. Conquest, the Court of Com-
mon Pleas rejected an argument that presented the relationship between a
theatre proprietor and a dramatist he had “employed” as one of “master”
and “servant” such that the labor of a “servant” became “the property of
his masters at the moment of production.”20  As Chief Justice Jervis con-
cluded: “it is upon the author in the first instance that the right is con-
ferred by the statute which creates it.”21
While copyright vested ab initio with the “author,” there were cases
in which an “employer” might be “the author.” Support for this was pro-
vided by the dicta of the Vice Chancellor Sir John Leach in Barfield v.
Nicholson, decided by the Court of Chancery in 1824, in discussing who
was the author and proprietor of a book, The Practical Builder, to which
the defendant and others had contributed:
[T]he person who forms the plan, and who embarks in the speculation of
a work, and who employs various persons to compose different parts of it,
adapted to their own peculiar acquirements — that he, the person who so
forms the plan and scheme of the work, and pays different artists of his
own selection who upon certain conditions contribute to it, is the author
and proprietor of the work, if not within the literal expression, at least
within the equitable meaning of the statute of Anne, which, being a reme-
dial law, is to be construed liberally.22
A contractual model of the work relationship only emerged in the nine-
teenth century in relation to the former category: “employees.” See SIMON
DEAKIN & FRANK WILKINSON, THE LAW OF THE LABOUR MARKET: INDUS-
TRIALISATION, EMPLOYMENT AND LEGAL EVOLUTION 36, 74, 78-79, 106
(2005).
20 Shepherd v. Conquest, (1956) 17 CB 427; 139 E.R. 1140, 1147.
21 Id. at 1147.  Another reason why this argument was rejected may be that, as
noted at note 19 above, the “master” and “servant” relationship was distinct
from that denoted by the terms “employer” and “employed” which were
used to refer to the plaintiff, the proprietor of the Surrey Theatre, and the
dramatist (called Courtney). The facts of Shepherd were that the Courtney
was “employed” by the plaintiff as a “stock author” to attend plays in
France with a view to adapting them for the English stage, and for which
purpose he was paid a weekly stipend and expenses.
22 2 L.J. Ch. (O.S.) 90, 102 (emphasis added).  This notion of authorship was put
forward in the context of considering an argument as to whether a Mr.
Kelly, who had formed the plan and scheme of the work and paid the con-
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This suggested that an employer who was also a senior contributor, i.e., a
contributor to the overall “plan and scheme” of the work, would be its sole
author.  Later case law left open this basis for authorship.  In Shepherd v.
Conquest, the Court of Common Pleas confined its conclusions to the facts
before it: that it was an “abuse of terms” to say that an employer who
“merely suggests the subject and has no share in the design or execution of
the work” was an “author.”  However, Chief Justice Jervis expressly left it
open that there might be other circumstances in which an employer might
be the first owner of copyright, and by implications the author.23
Such circumstances arose in Hatton v. Kean, which Justice Byles
presented as an example of the class of case upon which the court in Shep-
herd had “expressly abstained from pronouncing an opinion.”24  In Hat-
ton, the manager of a theatre was held to be “the author and designer of
an entire dramatic composition” (an adaptation of a number of Shake-
speare’s plays) and the music composed by a musician, who the manager
tributors, was a purchaser for value without notice of Nicholson’s contribu-
tion, such that he would not be bound by a restrictive covenant by which
Nicholson promised the plaintiff not to publish any work which would inter-
fere with a rival work to which Nicholson had previously contributed: The
Architectural Dictionary. Counsel for the plaintiff argued that Kelly would
only be a purchaser for value without notice if he had complied with the
formalities proscribed by the applicable copyright Act (the Statute of Anne
1709) that required assignments of copyright to be in writing.  Sir John
Leach dismissed this argument by finding Kelly to be the author and propri-
etor of the work.  Interestingly, this passage is not contained in the report of
the case in the English Reports, ((1824) 2 Sim. & Stu. 1; 57 E.R. 245), yet
the dicta came to be cited widely in subsequent cases and early treatises on
copyright. See, e.g., WALTER COPINGER, COPYRIGHT IN WORKS OF LITERA-
TURE AND ART 45 (1870) (after citing the rule in Shepherd, this dicta from
Barfield is quoted to support the statement that: “Where however the em-
ployers do more than suggest the subject, and have a share in or solely de-
sign the execution of the work, the case is different.”).  It is interesting to
note that Copinger was clearly aware of nineteenth-century U.S. rulings
that were early forerunners to the work for hire doctrine which would
emerge in the U.S. in the early twentieth century. See, e.g., id. at 44 (citing
Atwill v. Ferrett, 2 F. Cas. 195 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1846) (No. 640)).  Professor
Fisk in her history of the work for hire doctrine presents Atwill as an early
example of employer ownership, though on the basis that “employers ac-
quired a claim to the copyright based only on their intellectual contribu-
tions, not by virtue of having paid the employee to create.”  See Catherine
Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-For-Hire Doctrine, 15 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 25 (2003).  Also on the early history of the work for hire
doctrine in the U.S., see Oren Bracha The Ideology of Authorship Revisited:
Authors, Markets and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118
YALE L.J. 118, 186 (2008).
23 Shepherd, (1956) 139 E.R. at 1147.
24 (1860) 29 L.J.C.P. 20, 25.
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“employed” for that purpose, was merely “a part of, a mere accessory to
the main piece.”25  In these circumstances, the Court of Common Pleas
held that the “employer” was first owner of copyright in the “entire dra-
matic composition, including the musical portion” contributed by the mu-
sician,26 there being no need for written consent or assignment.27  The
court’s reasoning drew attention to the fact that the oral terms on which
the musician was “employed” were such that the music should “form part
of the entire dramatic composition”28 and that the music was composed in
accordance with “the plan designed and carried out” by the “employer.”29
Walter Copinger, in the first edition of his copyright treatise published in
1870, considered Hatton to be an application of the principle put forward
by Vice Chancellor John Leach in Barfield, that is, an “employer” who
“did more than suggest the subject” and contributed to the plan or scheme
of the work was both the author and first owner of copyright in the
work.30
25 Id. at 24 (Erle, C.J.).
26 Id. at 25.
27 The facts of this case were that there was no written contact of any nature
between “employer” and “employee,” the manager having “verbally em-
ployed the plaintiff.” Id. at 20.
28 Id.  In a later case it was made clear that Hatton would not apply where the
musical contribution to a larger dramatic production (a Christmas ballet)
was a “substantial, independent musical composition.”  Eaton v. Lake,
(1888) 20 Q.B.D. 378, 385.
29 Hatton, 29 L.J.C.P. at 24.  As Justice Crowder expressed it (29 L.J.C.P. at 25),
the musician’s contribution was “accessory to the one general design” of the
employer.
30 COPINGER, supra note 22, at 45.  The judgments in Hatton made clear that the
employee contributor had “no separate rights to the music” but this was
expressed to be “as between the plaintiff and the defendant” (Hatton,
(1860) 29 L.J.C.P. at 25 (Crowder, J.)) the case merely deciding that the
plaintiff had no right to prevent the representation of the dramatic piece as
a whole by the employer.  This did not rule out the possibility that the em-
ployee contributor might retain a copyright in the individual contribution
for other purposes, though in a subsequent case in which Hatton was ap-
plied, the Court of Queen’s Bench held that the contribution of an “em-
ployee” musician, in composing the music “as a mere adjunct and accessory
to the dramatic piece Lady Audley’s Secret, ‘became part and parcel of the
drama, and no longer has an independent existence as a musical composi-
tion.’”  Wallerstein v. Herbert, (1867) 15 WR 838, 839 (Cockburn, C.J.).
This conclusion appears also to have been supported by the early editions of
Copinger’s work, in which Hatton was cited as a case in which the individual
contributions “lose their separate identity.” COPINGER, supra note 22, at
44.  Interestingly, after the passage of the 1911 Act, the commentary in
Copinger would be revised such as to present these cases as relevant to a
new category of works defined by the 1911 Act: “collective works.”  The
provisions on collective works, that is works comprising “distinct parts by
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Viewed in the context of this contemporaneous case law, Levy con-
cerned an alternative means by which “employer” theatre managers might
argue that they were authors and thereby first owners of copyright: as joint
authors with the dramatists they “employed.”31  Indeed, the report of the
decision records that the claim of joint authorship was how the case was
“ultimately presented” following an unsuccessful attempt to argue that
Levy was the author and proprietor by virtue of his status as “employer”
(a matter “answered by Shepherd v Conquest”).32  While the Dramatic
Literary Copyright Act (and perhaps the Literary Copyright Act 1842)
contemplated that there might be cases of co-authorship, there was no
statutory guidance on when this would arise.33  This was a matter left to
different authors,” envisaged that the various parts might be works in their
own right (1911 Act §§ 35, 16(2)).  Consequently, in the edition of his work
which was published after the 1911 Act, the discussion in Copinger would
present a collective work as involving “two distinct copyrights, namely: (1)
in the collective work considered as a whole and (2) in the distinct works of
the various contributors to the collective work.” JAMES M. EASTON &
WALTER COPINGER, COPYRIGHT IN WORKS OF LITERATURE AND ART 224
(5th ed. 1915).  In this new legislative context, Copinger presented cases
such as Hatton and Barfield as examples of authorship of the collective
work as a whole (id. at 225, 110-11) that did not preclude authorship and
ownership by the individual contributor of a separate copyright in their in-
dividual contributions.
31 Another unsuccessful line of argument pursued by Levy in both Levy v. Rutley
and a number of other legal proceedings that he brought against owners of
theatres (located in Weymouth, Exeter, and Liverpool), was that he was the
dramatist’s assignee. See infra, note 46 and accompanying text, regarding
the failure of this argument in Levy v. Rutley.  In the other cases, which all
concerned the unauthorized performances of plays by dramatist John
Courtney (The Solder’s Progress, The Two Colts and Time and It’s All), the
proceedings either failed or were abandoned by Levy following hearing of
defense arguments as to defects in the assignment (either failure to comply
with formalities or on the basis that the assignment documents were forged)
or because Courtney had granted a license to the defendant prior to the
alleged assignment. See Levy v. Neeve (Ct. C.P.), THE TIMES May 3, 1871,
at 11, and May 4, 1871, at 11, Levy v. Lacy (writ dated Dec. 23, 1870, which
proceedings collapsed when Levy did not appear to prosecute before the
Surrey Assizes court in 1871. See UK National Archives CP40/4118; Sum-
mer Assizes, THE TIMES, Aug. 16, 1871, at 9; Northern Circuit, THE TIMES,
Aug. 17, 1871, at 11); Levy v. Heath (writ dated Dec. 21, 1870, heard before
Justice Willes in Spring Assizes 1871 and the Court of Exchequer in June
1873; see UK National Archives CP40/4116; Court of Common Pleas, THE
TIMES, May 24, 1871, at 11).
32 Levy v. Rutley, (1870–71) L.R. 6 C.P. 523, 530.
33 Section I of the Dramatic Literary Property Act 1833 stated that the term of
protection would be for twenty-eight years from first publication, or the life
of “the Author or Authors or Survivor of the Authors,” whichever period
was longer, as well as containing an interpretation clause which specified
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the judiciary and the question of what this might mean came to be ad-
dressed at length for the first time in Levy.34
The particular facts of Levy concerned a dispute between rival theatre
proprietors about the right to perform The King’s Wager, a play about the
adventures of Charles II after his escape from the battle of Worcester.
Lawrence Levy, the proprietor of the Victoria Theatre, had employed a
dramatist named Wilks to write the play in 1836.  Wilks presented the fin-
ished play to Levy, following which Levy made changes to it with the assis-
tance of two actors from his theatre company: he introduced a new scene
and made “alterations and additions to the dialogue” so as “to make it
more attractive to an audience.”35  The report of the litigation in The
Times characterized these as “sensation scenes” (in submissions by Coun-
that “whenever Authors . . . are spoken on in this Act in the Singular Num-
ber. . . the same shall extend to any Number of Persons . . .” (§ IV).  In his
commentary on this Act in Primary Sources on Copyright, Ronan Deazley
notes these to be the first UK statutory provisions on joint authorship. See
Deazley supra note 18, ¶ 10.  Section 2 of the Literary Copyright Act 1842,
dealing with copyright in “books,” contained a more general interpretation
provision that references to the singular in respect of inter alia “any Person
. . . shall be understood to include and to be applied to several Persons as
well as one Person,” though this was subject to the proviso that this would
not apply where “there shall be something in the subject or context repug-
nant to such construction.”  A number of cases, however, indicated that the
courts considered the 1842 Act to accommodate co-authorship.  In Maclean
v. Moody, (1858) 20 Sc. Sess. Cas. 2d Ser. 1154, a case about copyright in
shipping lists, the Court of Session clearly understood the 1842 Act to con-
template joint authorship, Lord Deas noting in passing that a work “may be
the joint production of two or more authors, whose contributions to it are
undistinguishable . . . . ” Id. at 1163.  Further, in Marzials v. Gibbons,
(1873–74) L.R. 9 Ch. App. 518, which concerned the right of an executor to
rely on the transitional provisions of section 4 of the 1842 Act, the Court of
Appeal did not raise any objection to the fact that the work in question, a
Methodist hymn book, was compiled by seven authors.  For the position
under the Fine Arts Copyright Act 1862, see infra, notes 82-86 and accom-
panying text.
34 As explained in note 33 supra, the judiciary had previously noted the possibil-
ity of joint authorship in cases such as Maclean decided under the Literary
Property Act 1842.  Joint authorship under the Dramatic Copyright Act
1833 was pleaded by Levy in earlier proceedings concerning the play Break-
ers Ahead: Levy argued that he was joint author of the play with a J.T.
Haines on the basis that Levy had “suggested some alterations in the last
scene, which gave a more sensational turn to the stage directions.”  Justice
Montague Smith referred the question of whether this had been proven to
the jury, who returned verdict for the defendant. Counsel for Levy sought
to request a fresh trial, on the basis of improper rejection of the evidence,
but this was refused. See Levy v. Cave (Ct. C.P.), THE TIMES, Dec. 14, 1870,
at 11, Jan. 16, 1871, at 11.
35 Levy, (1870–71) L.R. 6 C.P. at 529.
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sel for the plaintiff) and “additions . . . for the attention of the gallery” (in
argument put by Counsel for the defendant): one scene involved the Duke
of Buckingham striking the legs of a police constable who was hiding by
posing as a statue, to which the constable cried “Mercy, Mercy,” and in
another “the King was made to kiss a pretty barmaid.”36  The play was
published in 1840 and Wilks died in 1854.  Accordingly, if Wilks was the
sole author, copyright would have expired by the time of the allegedly
infringing performance put on by the defendant’s theatre.37  Levy brought
a claim for penalties under the Dramatic Literary Property Act 1833 alleg-
ing that he was Wilks’s co-author, with the consequence that copyright
continued to subsist in the play and that he was joint owner.
The case was heard by Winchester Assizes before Justice Byles and
Baron Pigott, with a verdict returned by the jury for Levy.38 This decision
was subsequently appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, where Levy’s
claim was unanimously rejected. While the judges accepted that joint au-
thorship might arise in cases where one author had contributed more than
another, Levy had merely made subsequent additions and alterations,
there being no common design with Wilks.  As Justice Byles explained,
joint authorship required a piece to be “written . . . jointly, in prosecution
of a pre-concerted joint design.”39  Agreeing with Justice Byles, Justice
Keating expressed this as “a joint labouring in furtherance of a common
design.”40  Finally, Justice Montague Smith delivered a judgment agreeing
with both the other judges.  As he explained, joint authorship demanded
an agreement “to write a piece, there being an original joint design, and
the co-operation of the two in carrying out that joint design . . . .”41
It is worth noting that Justice Montague Smith’s judgment was re-
ported differently in The Law Times Reports: he was reported as objecting
to the fact that there was “no agreement between the two, or intention on
Wilks’s part that they should have been joint authors originally.”42  Further,
rejecting Levy’s alternative claim that copyright had been assigned by vir-
tue of a receipt which stated that Wilks received payment for his “share
36 Court of Common Pleas, THE TIMES, Jan.  6, 1871, at 11.
37 As per § I of the Dramatic Literary Property Act 1833. See supra, note 33. The
term provided by the Dramatic Copyright Act 1833 was amended by the
Literary Copyright Act 1842, so as to bring it into line with the term appli-
cable to books (see infra, note 70). However this only applied to works
published after the passage of the 1842 Act. See Copyright Act 1842 ss. 3,
20.
38 See Plea Roll at UK National Archives CP40/116; Cause List at UK National
Archives ASSI 22/32.
39 Levy, (1870–71) L.R. 6 C.P. at 528.
40 Id. at 529.
41 Id. at 530.
42 (1871) 24 L.T.R. (N.S.) C.P. 621, 623 (emphasis added).
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title and interest as a co-author” with Levy, Justice Montague Smith is
recorded as saying that the only relevance of the receipt might be in the
context of the issue of joint authorship: as “evidence that they considered
themselves to be co-authors at that time,” though this finding was “not
warranted by the facts.”43  It was this report, with its inclusion of a test of
intention as to joint authorship, which was to be quoted at length in subse-
quent editions of Walter Copinger’s treatise on copyright, published dur-
ing the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.44
The court’s test of common design (and, as in The Law Times Report
or Copinger’s treatise, intention as to joint authorship on the part of
Wilks) supported a finding of sole authorship by a dramatist, as against an
“employer” manager, a result that appears, at least in part, to have been
influenced by the norms of play-writing in the particular context of the
theatre.  As Justice Montague Smith noted it would be “strange if not un-
just” to find co-authorship in the circumstances of the case as there are
probably very few instances — at least in modern times — of a play being
put upon the stage without some alteration by the manager.”45  The ap-
proach in Levy therefore ensured that the usual activities of theatre man-
agers, in making subsequent alterations to play scripts, would not be
sufficient to find a claim to joint authorship, a result that would mean that
managers could control the performance of plays at rival theatres.  Indeed,
giving judgment rejecting the alternative claim (that a manager’s receipt
could amount to an assignment of the playwright’s copyright), the court
expressed concern at the “inconvenient multiplication of rights and reme-
dies which never could have been contemplated.”46
This was also the implication of Shelley v. Ross, a joint authorship
case tried a few weeks after Levy, in which Justice Hannen appeared to
focus on the nature of the contribution of the purported joint author,
rather than common design.47  The sole issue in Shelley was whether the
plaintiff became a joint author of a play entitled Clam through making
“alterations in a dramatic piece, for the purpose of rendering it more at-
43 Id. All three judges rejected this claim.  As Justice Keating explained, the re-
ceipt did not amount to an assignment, it being a mere acknowledgement of
the payment of money or at most an undertaking to assign which was never
fulfilled. See Levy, (1870–71) L.R. 6 C.P. at 528.
44 WALTER COPINGER, COPYRIGHT IN WORKS OF LITERATURE AND ART 132-33
(2d ed. 1881); WALTER COPINGER, COPYRIGHT IN WORKS OF LITERATURE
AND ART 140 (London, Stevens & Haynes 3d ed. 1893); WALTER COP-
INGER, COPYRIGHT IN WORKS OF LITERATURE AND ART 111-12 (4th ed.
1904).
45 Levy, (1870–71) L.R. 6 C.P. 530.
46 Id. at 531 (Montague Smith, J.).
47 (1870–71) L.R. 6 C.P. 531; Bail Court, June 7, THE TIMES, June 8, 1871, at 10.
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tractive or better adapted for stage representation.”48  Justice Hannen re-
jected the claim: “alterations and additions . . . such as made it an acting
drama” could not found a claim to joint authorship, commenting that “the
stage carpenter might claim as joint author if the plaintiff’s claim was
admitted.”49
As well as being explained by the particular context of the theatre,
the adoption of a test that supported the position of the dramatist, re-
flected that there were other cases concerning authorship that were less
favorable to those that composed the work: as we have seen, Barfield v.
Nicholson and Hatton v. Kean instead protected the position of an “em-
ployer” who was also a senior contributor, i.e., the designer of the overall
plan and scheme of a work. In the nineteenth century, these decisions co-
existed with cases decided under contrasting provisions of separate legisla-
tion on artistic copyright. For instance, the Fine Arts Copyright Act 1862
contained an express provision vesting first ownership of copyright in an
“employer” (as the person providing good or valuable consideration)50
and in Nottage v. Jackson51 the Court of Appeal refused to interpret “au-
thorship” to denote “the common employer of all the artists and assist-
ants” involved in producing a portrait photograph, “the person who
conceives the idea and sends his materials and men to take it.”52 In Not-
tage, the Court of Appeal instead tied the definition of “authorship” to the
process of making the work, characterizing the tasks of the employee who
“superintended the arrangement, who . . . actually formed the picture by
putting the people into position”53 as activities of “originating, making,
producing, as the inventive or master mind.”54
Copyright law in the nineteenth century, therefore, spanned a number
of concepts of authorship: not just those under literary and dramatic copy-
right legislation favorable to “employers” that planned the overall scheme
of the work (e.g., Barfield and Hatton), but also concepts of authorship
that privileged those who were involved in the process of making or com-
posing the work (e.g., Nottage and Levy). These cases formed the back-
drop for contrasting developments in joint authorship that began in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  As we will now see, the
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, § 1.
51 Nottage v. Jackson, (1882–83) L.R. 11 Q.B.D. 627 (concerning the question of
who was the “author” of a carte de visite photograph of the Australian
Cricket Team, for the purposes of the registration requirements of section 4
of the 1862 Act).
52 Id. at 628 (per the argument of Counsel for the claimants: Mr. Pretheram, Q.C.
and Mr. Shortt).
53 Id. at 632 (Brett, M.R.).
54 Id. at 634 (Cotton, L.J.).
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result was that by the early twentieth-century differences of approach had
emerged between the UK and her self-governing dominions on the one
hand, and the U.S. on the other hand, despite both claiming lineage from
Levy.  These are now explored in turn.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF A STATUTORY TEST: THE UK
IMPERIAL COPYRIGHT ACT 1911
In the decades that followed Levy there were numerous attempts at
legislative reform of copyright in the UK. Copyright law at that time was
contained in fourteen different statutes, passed during the course of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, each concerning different subject
matter, such as engraving, sculpture and books.55 Reporting in 1878, the
Royal Commission on Copyright concluded that copyright law was
“wholly destitute of any sort of arrangement, incomplete, often obscure”
and in need of reform.56  In this more general reforming context, the ques-
tion of joint authorship was raised by the Society of Authors in a number
of legislative proposals put forward in the 1890s.  As we will see, like Levy,
these legislative proposals, and those that followed to the early twentieth
century, again placed emphasis on the composition of the work, a stance
that can be explained both by reference to the writing practices adopted
by those at the head of the Society of Authors, as well as the intersection
between joint authorship with more general copyright rules on the term of
protection.
The Society of Authors, established in 1884 for the “furtherance of
the Interests of Authors” under the presidency of poet laureate Alfred
Tennyson, was then under the chairmanship of the author Walter Besant.
As well as being a critic and an historian, Besant was well known for his
novels written with co-author James Rice, such as Ready Money Mortiboy,
The Golden Butterfly and The Chaplain of the Fleet. Besant and Rice be-
gan to collaborate in the early 1870s, and as Besant’s obituary in the Soci-
ety’s magazine The Author explained, in the following decade: “the joint
authors produced a series of novels which won them immediate popular-
55 For example, in addition to the Dramatic Literary Property Act 1833, five Acts
dealt with copyright in engravings (8 Geo. 2, c. 13 (1735); 7 Geo. 2, c. 38
(1767): 17 Geo. 3, c. 57 (1777): 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 59 (1836); 15 & 16 Vic., c. 12,
§ 14 (1852), and two further Acts dealing with copyright in sculpture (38
Geo. 3, c. 71 (1798) and 54 Geo. 3, c. 56 (1814)), as well as the Fine Arts
Copyright Act 1862 concerning painting, drawing and photography (25 & 26
Vic., c. 68), and the Literary Copyright Act 1842 dealing with copyright in
“books” (5 & 6 Vic., c. 45).
56 UNITED KINGDOM ROYAL COMMISSION ON COPYRIGHT, THE ROYAL COMMIS-
SION AND THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS, at C-2036, C-2036-1
XXIV.163, 253, ¶ 17 (1878).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CPY\62-2\CPY202.txt unknown Seq: 16 13-JUL-15 16:08
260 Journal, Copyright Society of the U.S.A.
ity, and a permanent place in English letters.”57  It is of no surprise, then,
that the Bills presented to Parliament by the Society of Authors all con-
tained provisions on joint authorship.  Indeed, “the novels of Besant and
Rice” were often referred to as a paradigm example of joint authorship in
the debates over the Society’s proposals by the Select Committees on
Copyright in the late 1890s,58 as well as informing the understanding of
authorship articulated in the first instance judgment in Nottage v. Jackson
(which as we saw, was a case which supported a concept of authorship
defined by reference to the process of composing the work).59
As we noted above, the existing UK statutes on dramatic and literary
copyright appeared to contemplate that there might be more than one au-
thor, but did not provide any statutory guidance as to when this might
arise.60  Joint authorship provisions were also largely absent from existing
local copyright legislation in the colonies,61 the Victoria Copyright Act
1869 being a rare example that contained an interpretation clause — “the
57 Sir Walter Besant, 12 THE AUTHOR 20, 22-23 (Jan. 7, 1901); see also 1 VICTOR
BONHAM CARTER, AUTHORS BY PROFESSION 127-28 (1978).
58 See, e.g, REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE COPYRIGHT BILL (H.L.)
AND THE COPYRIGHT (AMENDMENT) BILL (H.L.) 5 (1898) [hereinafter SE-
LECT COMMITTEE ON COPYRIGHT 1898] (evidence of John Murray (Q. 31)
(“a novel such as that by Besant and Rice, where nobody can tell which part
is attributable to which author.”); id. at 31 (evidence of Frederic Daldy (Q.
449) (“I speak of Besant and Rice as an instance [of joint authorship] that is
very well known.”); id. at 89 (Q. 1375) (Lord Knutsford in questioning
Queen’s Counsel Edward Cutler, asking whether a particular provision en-
compassed “joint authors, like Besant and Rice.”).  Later in the twentieth
century, “Besant and Rice” would also be referred to as an example of what
was denoted by “joint authorship” by the Gregory Committee on Copy-
right. See BOARD OF TRADE: REPORT OF THE COPYRIGHT COMMITTEE
(1952) [Cmd.] 8662, ¶ 25.
59 Nottage v. Jackson, (1883) L.T.R. 339, 341 (Field, J.) (“When I say ‘one per-
son’ I do not mean to deny that it may be joint. Several persons may com-
bine together as Mr Besant and Mr Rice . . . The Chaplain of the Fleet or
any book of that kind.”).  The Court of Appeal upheld the first instance
judgment.
60 See supra, note 33.  As we note later, joint authorship was neither referred to
expressly nor indirectly (e.g., through an interpretation clause) in the stat-
utes on artistic copyright.
61 In particular, local copyright legislation was passed in each of the following
colonies: Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasma-
nia, Victoria, Western Australia (all of the preceding states which were to
form the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901), New Zealand, India, Ca-
nada, Newfoundland, Cape Colony, Natal and the Transvaal (the latter
three states forming the Union of South Africa in 1910 with the Orange
River Colony). As we see below, these states (or their successors) were rep-
resented at an Imperial Conference on Copyright in 1910 that preceded the
passage of the UK Copyright Act 1911.
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single number shall include the plural” — that might cover joint author-
ship.62  There were, however, two exceptions: the local Copyright Acts of
Canada of 1875 (and later the Acts of 1886 and 1906) and Newfoundland
of 1890 provided for the subsistence of copyright in literary and artistic
works for a period of twenty-eight years from publication, subject to the
possibility of renewal for a further fourteen years if the “author, or any of
the authors when the work has been originally composed and made by more
than one person” was still alive at expiry of the original term.63  Therefore,
the Society of Authors’ reform attempts appear to be the first concerted
attempt in the UK, after the ruling in Levy, to formulate a statutory test
for joint authorship, though preceded by local legislation passed in Canada
and Newfoundland.64
The Society of Authors’ proposals on joint authorship all stressed a
contribution to the process of writing or composition.65  For example, the
62 33 Vict., No. 350, s. 2.  Interestingly, this interpretation provision was omitted
from the Victorian legislation that repealed and replaced the 1869 Act, the
Copyright Act 1890 (54 Vict., No. 1076).  It was also absent from legislation
passed in New South Wales in 1879 (42 Vict., No. 20) and South Australia in
1878 (41 & 42 Vict., No. 95) that was closely modelled on the 1869 Act.
63 Canadian Copyright Acts 1875 (38 Vict., c. 88, § 5); 1886 (49 Vict., c. 4, § 17)
(emphasis added); 1906 (R.S.C., c.70, § 19); Newfoundland Copyright Act
1890, c. 110, § 16.  As we see later, by 1911, the only other colony of those
listed in note 61 supra to have passed local legislation including a provision
on joint authorship was Australia.
64 A statutory test of joint authorship was included in an early draft of a copy-
right Bill presented to the House of Commons as part of a reform attempt
that took place in the 1880s.  However, this provision was soon abandoned
due to the controversies relating to its application in relation to artistic cop-
yright (discussed below) that became the focus of this initiative (the Bill
being drafted by solicitor Basil Field advising the Royal Academy of Arts).
See Copyright Bill, Bill 121, cl. 9, 1881 Parliamentary Papers [P.P.].  Like
the Society of Authors’ proposals of the 1890s, the test contained in the
1881 Bill stressed a contribution to the writing or composition of the work.
This proved controversial in an art institutional context in which artists rou-
tinely involved pupils or assistants in the execution of their work, but
neither attributed such pupils/assistants as authors nor considered them to
be copyright owners.  Clause 9 dealt with the latter point, providing that
where one joint author was the pupil of the other, instead of joint owner-
ship by pupil and “artist” copyright would be solely owned by the “artist.”
65 Emphasis on a contribution to writing was also made by the judiciary in a
number of early twentieth century cases, in which the contributors of ideas
claimed to be authors of literary works, though in a number of these cases
joint authorship with the person that composed the work was not claimed.
In Springfield v. Thame, (1903) 89 L.T. 242; 19 T.L.R. 650 (Ch.), Judge
Joyce accepted the argument of Thomas Scrutton, that copyright was in the
“particular form of language” meaning that the newspaper article in ques-
tion was authored by the sub-editor who wrote it, perhaps jointly with a
second sub-editor who touched it up, and not by the journalist that provided
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Bill introduced into the House of Lords by Lord Monkswell in 1890, de-
fined “joint work” as a “book, article, essay, poem, dramatic piece or mu-
sical composition . . . written, composed, or produced by two or more
persons and published as such.”66  A later clause provided that copyright
in a joint work, in absence of agreement to the contrary shall belong “to
persons by whom the same is written or composed jointly.”67  A later pro-
posal supported by the Society jointly with the publisher dominated Copy-
right Association, introduced into the House of Lords by Lord Monkswell
in 1899 and 1900, defined “joint authorship” as “a book written by joint
authors.”68
In addition to reflecting the paradigm of Besant and Rice, the empha-
sis on a contribution to writing or composition can be explained by refer-
ence to the debates on the term of protection of jointly authored works.
Each of the Bills of 1890, 1899 and 1900  proposed a term of life plus thirty
years linked to the life of the last surviving author.69  The term of life plus
the underlying story.  The reasoning in Springfield was followed in a num-
ber of other decisions delivered in the first half of the twentieth century.
See Bagge v. Millar, [1917–23] MacG. C.C. 179, 182 (Russell, J.) (relying on
Shepherd v. Conquest to establish that: “mere suggestion of an idea which is
then embodied by another in a dramatic work written by him does not . . .
constitute the originator of the idea as an author or joint author of the dra-
matic work.”); Evans v. E. Hulton & Co., [1923–28] MacG. C.C. 51, 56
(Tomlin, J.) (denying authorship or joint authorship status to a plaintiff who
“did not take any part in producing the express matter which is the original
literary work.”); Donaghue v. Allied Newspapers, Ltd., [1938] Ch. 106, 109
(Farwell, J.) (finding that the author is “the person who has clothed the
ideas in form).”  Of these cases, only Bagge and Evans included a claim that
the contributor of ideas was a joint author with the contributor of expres-
sion, the plaintiff contributors of ideas in the other cases claiming to be sole
author.
66 Copyright Bill, H.L. Bill 7, cl. 5, 1890–91 Parliamentary Papers [P.P.] [herein-
after 1890 Bill] (emphasis added).
67 Id. cl. 18(1) (emphasis added).
68 Literary Copyright Bill, H.L. Bill 44, cl. 8, 1899 Parliamentary Papers [P.P.]
[hereinafter 1899 Bill]; Literary Copyright Bill, H.L. Bill 18, cl. 8 (1900)
[hereinafter 1900 Bill].  On the Society of Authors’ support for this mea-
sure, see BONHAM CARTER, supra note 57, at 164.
69 1890 Bill, supra note 66, cl. 15(2); 1899 Bill, supra note 68, cl. 8,; 1900 Bill,
supra note 68, cl. 8.  This was also the case as regards the Bill introduced
into the House of Lords in 1898 by Lord Herschell, supported by the Copy-
right Association.  While this did not contain a definition of joint author-
ship, the clause on term of protection stated that in the case of a work
published in the “true name” of a “plurality of authors” the term would
expire thirty years after the end of the year in which the last survivor died.
See Copyright Bill, H.L. Bill 21, cl. 2(iii), 1898 Parliamentary Papers [P.P.].
The phrase “plurality of authors” came under much criticism in the Lords’
Select Committee for its wide ambit. See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE ON
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thirty years itself was seen as a significant extension of copyright com-
pared to that provided for under the existing Acts70 and in the debates on
the term of joint authorship it was questioned whether it was “just” for a
joint author to get not only “the benefit of his interest” but also “the bene-
fit of the interest of his co-writers also.”71  In particular, concerns were
raised that the joint authorship provisions might be “used for dishonest
purposes.”72  As Lord Thring explained to the House of Lords’ Select
Committee in 1898:
Supposing you and I were writing a book, it is perfectly possible that
practically one of us may have written the whole book, and yet the other
may have been put in simply for the purpose of prolonging its life. . . . by
a trick it may be used dishonestly . . . .73
In this context, the emphasis on a contribution to writing or composition
may be understood as an attempt to ensure that each co-author made a
genuine contribution to the work, to guard against joint authorship being
used as a “trick” for prolonging term.
The debates on term in the Select Committee of 1898 also influenced
the development of another aspect of the proposed legislative scheme: the
COPYRIGHT 1898, supra note 58, at 67 (Q. 1115).  As Queen’s Counsel Cut-
ler, who drafted that Bill, explained in giving evidence, he considered “plu-
rality of authors” to derive from Levy and in that Bill the phrase was meant
to denote cases of joint authorship only. Id. at 89-90 (Q. 1375, Q. 1377, Q.
1382).  In the Literary Copyright Bills of 1899 and 1900 “plurality of au-
thors” was used to denote cases of multiple authorship other than joint au-
thorship.  This is discussed later infra.
70 See, e.g., the comments of George Herbert Thring, the Secretary to the Society
of Authors, in giving evidence to the Select Committee on Copyright in
1898. Id. at 155 (Q. 2424).  The term of protection for both literary and
dramatic copyright was governed by the 1842 Act: the longest of the life of
the author plus seven years or forty-two years from first publication (sec-
tions 3 and 20 of the 1842 Act).  As noted above, the 1842 Act contained no
express provision on how this term applied to joint authorship, unlike the
provisions on term contained in section 1 of the Dramatic Literary Property
Act 1833 (see supra, notes 33, 37).  Instead, the 1842 Act merely provided
inter alia that any person in the singular, shall be understood “to include
and be applied to several persons, as well as one person . . . unless there
shall be something in the subject of context repugnant to such construc-
tion.”  In Maclean v. Moody, 1858) 20 Sc. Sess. Cas. 2d Ser. 1154, 1163, Lord
Deas considered that the 1842 Act did contemplate joint authorship, com-
menting that this meant that “the life of one of them cannot be the criterion
for measuring the privilege.”
71 For example, this was raised by Lord Thring in questioning the publisher Fre-
deric Daldy giving evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on
Copyright 1898. SELECT COMMITTEE ON COPYRIGHT 1898, supra note 58,
30-31 (Q. 432).
72 Id. Q. 434.
73 Id. Q. 435, Q. 438.
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requirement that each author’s contribution is “not distinct.”  A term of
protection tied to the life of the last surviving author was only seen as just
in cases where it was “impossible . . . to decide which has written which
part”; “to deal with the cases that you cannot distinguish” between contri-
butions.74  By contrast, such a term could not be justified in a case where
every author’s contribution is “perfectly separate and distinct.”75 Hence
the Literary Copyright Bills of 1899 and 1900 contrasted “joint author-
ship” to cases of “plurality of authors” where “a book is written in distinct
parts by different authors.”  Unlike joint authorship where the term was
linked to the last surviving author in the case of “plurality of authors” the
Bills of 1899 and 1900 provided that “each author shall be entitled to the
portion written by him in the same manner as if it were a separate
book.”76
The reform attempts of the turn of the century failed, and the next
impetus for reform was not until after the revision of the Berne Conven-
tion on Copyright of 1908. The resulting Copyright Act 1911,77 which re-
pealed and replaced the then twenty-two subject specific statutes with a
single copyright code applying to all copyright works, set out a test for
joint authorship in the following terms: “a work of joint authorship”
means a work produced by the collaboration of two or more authors in
which the contribution of one author is not distinct from the contribution
of the other author or authors.”78
This definition encompassed a number of the aspects of joint author-
ship which had been worked out in the debates of the previous decades:
the requirement of “collaboration” may stem from the test of common
design in Levy, and need for a contribution to be “not distinct” from the
statutory debates of the late 1890s.  The term of protection however was
differently formulated: either a term of the life of the last surviving author,
or a term of the life of the author who first dies plus fifty years, whichever
was longer.79  While this was different from previous proposals, the provi-
74 Id. Q. 443 (Viscount Knutsford to Frederic Daldy).
75 Id. Q. 441 (Lord Monkswell).
76 1899 Bill, supra note 68, cl. 9; 1900 Bill, supra note 68, cl. 9.
77 1 & 2 Geo. 5., c. 46.
78 Copyright Act 1911 § 16(3).  This test was included in each of the Copyright
Bills of 1911. See Cl. 16(3) of each of the following Copyright Bills: Bill 149,
1911 Parliamentary Papers [P.P.]; Bill 296, 1911 Parliamentary Papers
[P.P.]; H.L. Bill 191, 1911 Parliamentary Papers [P.P.]; H.L. Bill 227, 1911
Parliamentary Papers [P.P.].  There was no definition of joint authorship in
the 1910 Copyright Bill (Bill 282, 1910 Parliamentary Papers [P.P.]), intro-
duced to prepare the ground for the Bills that were to follow in 1911.
79 The provision on the term of protection contained in the 1911 Act first ap-
peared in the Bill of 1910, and was retained in each of the Bills of 1911. 1910
Bill, supra note 78, cl. 19(1); 1911 Bills supra note 78, cl. 16(1)).  Article 7 of
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sion on term stemmed from debates in the Imperial Copyright Conference
of 1910, which reflected earlier concerns with neither over nor under-com-
pensating each co-author.  As Lord Tennyson, representing Australia,80
explained to the Conference which comprised representatives of inter alia
the self-governing dominions of New Zealand, South Africa and Canada,
the objective of ensuring all joint authors were adequately protected (e.g.,
by ensuring that the term did not expire during their lifetime) had to be
balanced against the need to “prevent fraud.”  Mr. Temple Franks of the
UK Board of Trade warned that were a different solution adopted a “very
young author . . . might be fraudulently joined in many cases” for no other
reason than to prolong the term.81
In another respect, however, the 1911 Act (like the Bills of 1910 and
1911 that preceded it) differed radically from the case law and legislative
proposals of the previous decades.  As we have seen, the history of joint
authorship in the late nineteenth and turn of the twentieth century lay
with cases and legislative proposals exclusively concerning literary and
dramatic copyright.  While obiter dicta in one case suggested that the judi-
ciary would read joint authorship provisions into the Fine Arts Copyright
Act 1862,82 the lack of reference to multiple authors in the Act’s provi-
the Berlin revision of the Berne Convention required countries of the
Union to provide a term of protection of the life of the author plus fifty
years, but remained silent on the question of joint authorship.
80 Interestingly, some five years earlier the Commonwealth of Australia enacted
local copyright legislation that provided for a term in the case of jointly
authored works based on a period after the life of the last surviving author.
Australian Copyright Act 1905 No. 25, s. 17(3).  However, this was for a
shorter term (forty-two years or the life of the last surviving author plus
seven years) and therefore perhaps was not seen as giving rise to the con-
cern about fraud voiced by Australia’s representative at the 1910 conference
noted above.  The Australian legislation of 1905, along with that passed by
Canada and Newfoundland (see supra note 63), are the only examples of
local copyright statutes that refer to joint authorship passed before 1911 by
the colonies listed at note 61 above.
81 MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE IMPERIAL COPYRIGHT CONFERENCE, 1910,
UK National Archives CO 886/4/4, at 120-21.  In the context of ensuring
that the term of protection was not too long, Sir H. Llewelyn Smith, advis-
ing the Board of Trade, gave the example of scientific text books which are
“kept up to date with new additions” where it was common for “a veteran”
to bring in “a youngster fresh from university, who devils the thing up and it
appears under joint names.”  The proposal for a term of whichever was
longer of the life of the last surviving author or fifty years after the life of
the author who first dies, was agreed by the Imperial Conference (at 200)
and contained in the Memorandum of the conference proceedings which
was issued as a Parliamentary Paper. See IMPERIAL COPYRIGHT CONFER-
ENCE 1910, MEMORANDUM OF PROCEEDINGS, 1910 Parliamentary Papers,
Cd. 5272, at 7, ¶ 7(d).
82 Kenrick v. Lawrence, (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 99, 106.
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sions83 caused Master of the Rolls Brett to question this in the Court of
Appeal case of Nottage v. Jackson.84  Further, the absence of the issue of
joint authorship in the legislative proposals and debates on artistic copy-
right is striking, particularly in the debates of 1899 and 1900, in which Ar-
tistic Copyright Bills were considered alongside the Literary Copyright
Bills by the same parliamentary Select Committees.85  An explanation for
this may well lie with controversies surrounding the use of assistants by
artists in the late nineteenth century to “aid in the execution of original
works,” which sat uneasily with an art market that valued art “according
to the hand that painted it.”86  Therefore, while the Society of Authors was
formulating a test of joint authorship in the 1890s which stressed contribu-
tions to writing or composition, the same test might have thrown up diffi-
culties for the very different art institutional context in which painters
operated, which dominated the debates on artistic copyright during the
same period.87
83 Unlike the Dramatic Copyright Act 1833, the 1862 Act did not contain a refer-
ence to “the author or authors or survivor of the authors” in the provision
on term, neither did it contain an interpretation clause, as in the case of the
Literary Copyright Act 1842, which stated that a reference to a person in
the singular would denote the plural. These provisions are discussed supra,
note 33.
84 (1882–83) L.R. 11 Q.B.D. 627, 631 (“Here you have . . . two gentlemen stated
to be authors. Can two people be the authors of a photograph? It is difficult
to say, but if they are, for whose life is it to last?  For the life of one of them,
or for the life of the longest liver or what?”).  While Lord Justice Bowen did
accept that the 1862 Act might be interpreted to allow for joint authorship,
he considered this to be a matter which was not in the contemplation of the
legislators who drafted the legislation: “the person who drew this section
evidently thought that in ninety nine cases out of a hundred there would be
only one author.  The idea of there being two authors seems never to have
presented itself to him . . . .  Whoever drew this section did not . . . imagine,
apparently, the case of an author being more than one person.” Id. at 637-
38.  These statements were cited in a contemporary treatise on copyright by
John Shortt (who had appeared as Counsel for the plaintiffs in Nottage),
which presented Master of the Rolls Brett as having “seemed to doubt
whether the author must not be a single person.” JOHN SHORTT, THE LAW
RELATING TO WORKS OF LITERATURE AND ART 127 (London, Reyes &
Turner 2d ed. 1884).
85 See Artistic Copyright Bill, H.L Bill 45;  and Artistic Copyright Bill, H.L. 19,
1900 Parliamentary Papers [P.P.].  It is also noted that the provisions on
“joint authors” in the local Australian Act of 1902 ss. 17(3), 19, discussed at
supra, note 80) applied only to literary, dramatic and musical copyright, and
not to artistic copyright.
86 See DELABERE ROBERTON BLAINE, ON THE LAWS OF ARTISTIC COPYRIGHT
AND THEIR DEFECTS 28 (London, John Murray 1853).
87 The joint authorship status of pupils or assistants arose in one example given
by Queen’s Counsel Edward Cutler, in discussing the joint authorship pro-
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As well as applying to all copyright subject matter, the 1911 Act’s test
of joint authorship also operated throughout the Empire, being adopted
by the UK’s self-governing dominions.88  Whereas the mid-twentieth cen-
tury would see change to the 1911 Act’s approach to the term of jointly
authored works (since the Brussels revision in 1948 the Berne Convention
has required signatories to provide a term of fifty years from the death of
the last surviving author),89 as we have seen, the substantive test of joint
authorship set out in the 1911 Act is contained in the current UK copy-
right legislation.90
III. LEVY V. RUTLEY IN THE U.S.
While the UK and its self-governing dominions had a statutory test of
joint authorship by the early twentieth century, the contemporaneous U.S.
Copyright Act passed in 1909 contained no such provision.  The story of
joint authorship doctrine in the U.S. was instead one of judicial develop-
ment.  The key case in this regard was Maurel v. Smith decided in 1915 by
Judge Learned Hand then sitting in the U.S. Southern District Court of
New York.91  As we will now see, while Judge Hand drew on Levy v.
Rutley, which was the sole authority on joint authorship cited in the ex-
isting U.S. copyright treatises,92 he did so in conjunction with an interpre-
tation of another nineteenth century English case which was discussed
above: Hatton v. Kean.93  This set the foundations for a U.S. approach to
joint authorship that differed from that taken by the UK and those coun-
tries that were part of her dominions in 1911.
visions on literary and musical copyright before the 1898 Select Committee:
the Twelfth Mass by Mozart, “where he wrote the Credo, the rest being
done by his pupils.”  Queen’s Counsel Cutler was of the view that this
would be a case of joint authorship on the part of Mozart and his pupils.
See SELECT COMMITTEE ON COPYRIGHT 1898, supra note 58, at 23 (Q.
1380). See also 33 Vict. No. 350, s. 2.
88 See, e.g., Canadian Copyright Act 1927§ 2(k); New Zealand Copyright Act
1913 s. 22(3); Australian Copyright Act 1912 s. 12.
89 Art. 7bis.  This standard had been set out in Article 7bis(1) of the previous
revision of the Convention, at Rome in 1928, but Article 7bis(2)–(3) went
on to provide for reciprocity where a Union country granted a lesser term
of protection (the minimum permissible term being the life of the last sur-
viving author).
90 See supra, note 3.
91 220 F. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
92 See EATON DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL
PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 237 (Boston,
Little, Brown & Co. 1879); R.R. BOWKER, COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORY AND
ITS  LAW: BEING A SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF COPY-
RIGHT 101 (1912).
93 See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
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Maurel v. Smith concerned a comic opera called Sweethearts, to which
the plaintiff had contributed the scenario and the defendants the lyrics/
libretto.  Reviewing the law on joint authorship, Judge Learned Hand said
he had “been able to find strangely little law regarding the rights of joint
authors of books or dramatic compositions.”94  Indeed, the “only case in
the books in which the matter appears to have been discussed” was Levy
v. Rutley, and Judge Hand cited dicta from the judgments of Justice Keat-
ing95 and Justice Montague Smith,96 which expressed joint authorship as
requiring an agreement to write a work amounting to a common design.
On the facts of Maurel, this was held to be satisfied because the parties’
contributions had been made on the basis of an agreement that they were
joint authors of the opera.
Judge Hand then went on to consider whether joint authorship would
apply where a contribution was separately composed, as in the case of the
lyrics to Sweethearts.  He concluded “whatever their origin, in their pres-
entation, the whole was single” and the subsequent separate publication of
contributions would also “not break this original unity, because it is impos-
sible to say how much of their vogue was due to them alone, and how
much to their presentation along with the opera as a whole.”97  Interest-
ingly, in support of this position, Judge Hand looked to the English case of
Hatton v. Kean, citing it as authority for the proposition that “one who
contributes to such a joint production does not retain any several owner-
ship in his contribution, but that it merges into the whole.”98  Of course, it
will be recalled from the discussion above, that Hatton was not a case on
joint authorship; rather the Court of Common Pleas had used the analysis
of “merger into a whole” to support a finding of sole authorship by an
“employer” who had determined the overall design and plan of the
work.99  Drawing these points together, Judge Hand concluded that “com-
94 220 F. at 199.
95 “If two persons undertake jointly to write a play, agreeing on the general out-
line and design and sharing the labour of working it out, each would be
contributing to the whole production, and they might be said to be joint
authors of it; but to constitute joint authorship there must be a common
design.”  (1870–71) L.R. 6 C.P. 523, 529 (Keating, J.).
96 “But I take it that, if two persons agree to write a piece, there being an original
joint design and the co-operation of the two in carrying out that joint de-
sign, there can be no difficulty in saying they are joint authors of the work,
though one may do a larger share than the other.” Id. at 530 (Montague
Smith, J.)
97 Maurel, 220 F. at 200.
98 Id. at 201.
99 See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.  It is interesting to note that by
the second decade of the twentieth century, Hatton would be reinterpreted
in Copinger (published 1915) as a case relevant to “authorship” of “collec-
tive works,” a new category of copyright work introduced by the 1911 Act.
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mon design, mentioned in Levy v. Rutley” arose where contributors
“knowingly engage in the production of a piece which is to be presented
originally as a whole only . . . .”100
Judge Hand’s decision in Maurel, which is today seen as the U.S. ori-
gin on joint authorship, on the one hand, evidences similarity with contem-
poraneous UK developments: the emphasis on the common design test
from Levy, gave joint authorship in the U.S. and UK a common root.  This
was, therefore, neither an instance of courts throwing off “old legal
chains” nor deliberately “expressing their freedom” in adopting an equally
reasonable divergent approach for its “own sake.”101 On the other hand,
Judge Hand’s dicta in Maurel laid the foundations for a significant differ-
ence in U.S. and UK approaches. As we saw above, in the UK, the legisla-
tive debates about the justice of granting one co-author the “benefit” of a
term based on the last surviving co-author’s life, had resulted in joint au-
thorship being drawn in narrower terms, applying only in situations where
the contributions could not be separated and resulted in the statutory re-
quirement that the contributions be “not distinct.”  By contrast, in Maurel,
the concern about how to attribute the popularity of one contribution to
that of another produced a test that focused on presentation to the public,
thereby applying joint authorship to a wider set of circumstances.
In part this may reflect differences in the broader framework of U.S.
copyright rules: the arguments relating to term that had influenced devel-
opments in the UK were irrelevant in the context of U.S. copyright where
term was instead calculated exclusively by reference to a term of years
from publication.102  Instead, Learned Hand’s emphasis on the “presenta-
tion” of the work to the public appears to be motivated by the rules gov-
erning the inter-relation of statutory copyright and rights in unpublished
works: the effect of publication by the defendants, opined Judge Hand,
was to destroy rights at common law in the whole opera, so it was equita-
ble that the resulting statutory property should be jointly owned by the
plaintiff.103  Further, the ground for future differences may have been pre-
pared by the Circuit Court decision affirming Judge Hand’s decision; this
cited the general principle of joint authorship set out in Walter Copinger’s
UK treatise.104  It will be recalled that Copinger fleshed out this general
As explained in note 30 supra this envisaged that individual contributions
might attract separate copyright, as works in their own right, alongside
copyright in the collective work as a whole. This interpretation of Hatton is
therefore in contrast to its contemporaneous interpretation by Judge Hand
Maurel in shaping the different category of joint authorship.
100 Maurel, 220 F. at 199.
101 NG, BENTLY & D’AGOSTINO, supra note 1, at 6-7; see also supra, note 17.
102 Copyright Act 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080.
103 Maurel, 220 F. at 201.
104 271 F. 211, 215 (2d Cir. 1921).
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principle by reference to the report of Levy in The Law Times Report, as a
test of intention to co-authorship, unlike the Law Report version of the
case which was to be cited by courts in other common law jurisdictions.105
In the decades that followed, Maurel came to be applied by the U.S.
courts so as to develop the dicta deriving from Judge Hand’s reading of
Hatton, that is “merger into a whole,” into a test of intention.  While Levy
continued to be cited, it was the test of “intention to merge into a whole”
that came to delineate the ambit of “common design.”  For example, in
Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., Judge Hand, now
sitting as a circuit judge, after citing the test of “joint labouring in further-
ance of a common design” from Levy, held that this was satisfied where
joint authors “mean their contributions to be complementary in the sense
that they are to be embodied in a single work to be performed as such.”106
Consequently, where the plaintiff composed words that were intended to
be the words of a song, he became a joint author with a composer who
subsequently, without the plaintiff’s knowledge, set the words to music.
This principle also came to be applied and extended in a later case,
Shapiro Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co.,107 to find co-authorship
between composer and lyricist in a case where a lyricist set words to pre-
existing music, the music having been originally written by a composer in
collaboration with another lyricist.  In those circumstances, it was held that
the composer and second lyricist were joint authors of a new work.  Judge
Swan, with whom the other judges of the Second Circuit (including Judge
Hand) agreed, held that it was immaterial to the finding of joint author-
ship between composer and second lyricist that the composer’s original
intention to have his music combined with the words by the first lyricist
was realized, the relevant intent instead being the composer’s more gen-
eral intention for the music to be combined with words.  The principle was
extended yet further in a case concerning the same parties, decided a dec-
ade later. In that case, the Second Circuit held that the relevant intention,
that is “intent . . . to merge the two contributions into a single work, to be
performed as unit for the pleasure of hearers” was to be measured at the
time the second contribution was made.108  Further, the relevant intent
was on the part of the author where s/he remained the copyright owner,
but on the part of the copyright owner where copyright had been assigned.
105 The passage in Copinger referring to dicta from Levy as including a test of
intention to co-authorship (see supra, note 44 and accompanying text) im-
mediately preceded the passage cited by the Circuit Court.
106 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir. 1944).
107 161 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1946).
108 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. Jerry Vogel Music, 221 F.2d 569, 570 (2d Cir.
1955).
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In the U.S. therefore, the test of “common design” in Levy was inter-
preted by the judiciary as an intention on the part of the author or subse-
quent owner, for the contribution to be merged into a whole.  As the U.S.
Southern District Court of New York noted in Picture Music, Inc. v.
Bourne, Inc., the result of these cases was that: “No longer does there
seem to be required a pre-concerted common design or active collabora-
tion.  It is now sufficient if there be any ‘fusion of effort . . . .’”109  This
contrasts to the statutory test contained in legislation in the UK and her
self-governing dominions, in which “common design” had become a test of
“collaboration.”
These early differences in approach can be explained by the U.S.
courts considering the intersection between the consequences of a finding
of joint authorship for the cultural context within which litigation most
commonly arose: popular songs.  By the early twentieth century, the U.S.
and the UK conceived of the consequences of co-ownership differently.
While in both the U.S. and UK, it was accepted that co-owners owned as
tenants in common, in the UK this was understood to necessitate consent
on the part of all co-owners to exploitation.  As Master of the Rolls Jessel
explained in Powell v. Head, another action for penalties under the Dra-
matic Copyright Act 1833 decided a few years after Levy, “where there
are two proprietors, the one cannot represent without the consent of the
other proprietor.”110  By contrast in the U.S. there was authority that a co-
owner was free to exploit the work without the other co-owners” con-
sent.111  In developing the test of intention to merge into a whole, the U.S.
109 314 F. Supp. 640, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (Pollack, J.) (quoting GEORGE D. CARY,
JOINT OWNERSHIPS OF COPYRIGHT 689 (1963)).
110 Powell v. Head, (1879) 12 Ch.D. 686, 689-90 (Jessel, M.R.), approved, Lauri v.
Renad, [1892] 3 Ch. 402, 412 (Kekewich, J).  The approach in Powell and
Lauri was followed by Judge Rowlatt under the 1911 Act in Cescinsky v.
Routledge, [1916] 2 K.B. 325, 329.
111 See Carter v, Bailey, 64 Me. 458, 463-54 (1874) (Virgin, J.) (stating that during
the copyright term: “All others within that period, having no license from
[the co-owners] or some one of them are excluded. Each can exercise his
own right alone . . . if none be allowed to enjoy his legal interest without the
consent of all, then one, by withholding his consent, might practically de-
stroy the value of the whole use. And a use only upon condition of account-
ing for profits, would compel a disuse . . . .”) (emphasis added). See also
ARTHUR W. WEIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW: WITH SPECIAL REFER-
ENCE TO THE PRESENT UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT ACT 254 § 693, at 253,
§ 1523, at 547 (1917). Weil stated, relying on Carter v. Bailey, that it was not
even necessary for a co-owner to account to the other co-owners’ for their
share of the profits of exploitation.  However, cases like Maurel v. Smith
illustrate that the obligation to account to other co-owner(s) would arise in
cases where the courts found an agreement to that effect. See also Note,
Accounting Between Co-owners of a Copyright, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 421, 422
(1948).  As regards the significance of the consequences of co-ownership in
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courts favored a policy of facilitating the exploitation and dissemination of
copyright works, more particularly popular songs where lyrics and music
were generally exploited together.  As Judge Smith reasoned in the second
Shapiro Bernstein case, to deny joint authorship would be to leave the
authors with “a barren right in the words of a worthless poem, never in-
tended to be used alone” concluding that: “Such a result is not to be fa-
vored.”112  This was a point also raised by Judge Hand in Edward B.
Marks:
To allow the author to prevent the composer, or the composer to prevent
the author, from exploiting that power to please, would be to allow him
to deprive his fellow of the most valuable part of his contribution; to take
away the kernel and leave him only the husk.113
The different consequences of co-ownership in the UK, which required the
consent of all the co-owners to exploitation, meant that in the UK joint
authorship could not be used to fulfil this objective.114
In subsequent cases, the broad interpretation of the test of intent
came under criticism in particular because the original author would bene-
fit from a new term of protection whenever there was a subsequent “fu-
sion of effort.”115  The first statutory test of joint authorship in the U.S.
was, in part, a response to these difficulties.  This was contained in the
Copyright Act 1976 that continues to apply in the US, and defined a “joint
work” as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that
their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of
a unitary whole.”116  Therefore, while the test of intention to merge into a
whole remained the “touchstone” of joint authorship,117 the statute made
clear that intent was on the part of the authors and to be measured at the
time the work was prepared.
the U.S. for the comparative law of co-authorship today, see M. Perry & T.
Margoni, Ownership in Complex Authorship: A Comparative Study of Joint
Works, 34 EIPR 22 (2012) (comparing the U.S. approach to a civil law juris-
diction: Italy).
112 Shapiro, 221 F.2d at 570.
113 Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d
Cir. 1944).
114 This difference aside, it is noteworthy that the U.S. cases developing common
design into a test of intention to merge into a whole, all concerned the
words and music of a song. In the UK, such facts did not give rise to the
question of joint authorship, due to the UK’s different concept of the
“work,” which separated the lyrics into a “literary work” and music into a
“musical work.”
115 See Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
116 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
117 H.R. REP. NO. 1476, at 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736;
S. REP. NO. 473, at 103-04 (1975), cited in Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500,
505 (2d Cir. 1991).
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IV. CONCLUSION
This article has explained the development of distinct tests for joint
authorship in two common law jurisdictions from the common root of
Levy v. Rutley.  While Levy formed a shared starting point, the founda-
tions for the emergence of divergence were set by the early twentieth cen-
tury, as joint authorship came to be shaped by concerns informed by
particular frameworks of national copyright rules (e.g., term, the circum-
stances leading to loss of protection of common law, and the consequences
of co-ownership) as considered in relation to the norms of specific cultural
sectors that dominated the fora in which the implications of joint author-
ship were debated and considered (literature in the UK and popular music
in the U.S.).  In this way, in situating the story of joint authorship within
the context of wider differences in national rules and the cultural contexts
in which they were considered, the research contained in this article con-
tributes to a broader picture of historical diversity in UK and U.S. copy-
right law. This supports the thesis that the story of “fracture” noted in The
Common Law of Intellectual Property, is not one restricted to recent
times.
How might the comparative historical experience uncovered in this
article enable us critically to reflect on joint authorship in the U.S. and UK
today?  As regards the U.S., at a first glance, history might seem of little
relevance to the present: in Childress, a leading case on joint authorship,
the U.S. Second District Court considered Levy to be nothing more than
“useful in pointing an inquiry in the right direction.”118  However, this
point aside, some more general observations can be made, using history as
a standpoint for reflecting on aspects of the current U.S. law on joint au-
thorship.  On the one hand, there is some continuity between U.S. ap-
proaches today and early English case law of the nineteenth century in
terms of the types of factors that shape differences in joint authorship.  For
example, both in the nineteenth century and today the ambit of joint au-
thorship has been influenced by rules vesting authorship and ownership in
employers.  Just as the ruling in Levy defined joint authorship so as not to
undermine the limits on the vesting of copyright ownership in employers
in Barfield and Hatton, so in the U.S. in more recent times, case law re-
stricting the ambit of joint authorship is frequently explained by a change
in legislative policy with the passage of the Copyright Act 1976, narrowing
the circumstances in which copyright vests in employers.119  Similarly, un-
like other areas of law where the U.S. constitutional provision has resulted
in different types of consideration shaping U.S. law, in joint authorship
118 Childress, 945 F.2d at 504.
119 See generally Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance and the Captive Collab-
orator: Preserving the Rights of Joint Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193 (2001).
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parallels can be noted between the concerns noted in Levy and current
U.S. decisions, which define “co-authorship” in a manner that takes into
account its implications for the cultural domain.120  Therefore, while the
story of fracture between U.S. and UK approaches may have a long his-
tory, there is continuity in the types of factors that impact on the courts’
interpretation of joint authorship in the past and present.
In other respects, the nineteenth century experience highlights ways
in which the current U.S. approach differs from the past: history provides
a basis for critical reflection on how the courts utilise nineteenth century
authorities today.  For example, a leading case decided by the U.S. Ninth
Circuit District Court is Aalmuhammed v. Lee,121 and this has been
criticised as favoring the position of senior collaborators.122  In that case,
the plaintiff, a consultant on Islamic issues, who claimed to have inter alia
written scenes relating to a Hajj pilgrimage, was not a joint author of the
film Malcolm X with director Spike Lee, as “control” was an index of “au-
thorship” and the plaintiff’s contribution was subject to Spike Lee’s ap-
proval. Interestingly, in reaching this conclusion, the court drew on dicta
from the English nineteenth century case of Nottage v. Jackson, which was
cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in Burrow Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony: that an “author” is the person who “superintended the arrange-
ment” by “actually [forming] the picture” or the “originating, making, pro-
ducing, as the inventive or master mind, the thing which is to be
protected.”123  Yet, it will be recalled that in Nottage, the Court of Appeal
used this reasoning to tie “authorship” to the process of making the work,
in contrast to the concept of authorship in Barfield and Hatton that
120 See the discussion regarding Levy, see supra, notes 45-46; see also Aalmuham-
med v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000) (regarding the constitutional pro-
vision which states that copyright has an important role to play in
promoting artistic progress: “Progress would be retarded rather than pro-
moted, if an author could not consult with others and adopt their useful
suggestions without sacrificing sole authorship of the work. Too open a defi-
nition of author would compel authors to insulate themselves and maintain
ignorance of the contributions others make . . . the arts would be the poorer
for that.”).
121 Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1227.  In the Ninth Circuit, the factors that inform
the “intention to co-authorship” test applied in Childress are instead con-
sidered to inform a requirement that each contributor is an “author.” See
id. at 1233-34 (“Although the Second and Seventh Circuits do not base their
decisions on the word “authors” in the statute, the practical results they
reach are consistent with ours.”).
122 Id.  Peter Jaszi is thanked for drawing attention to this consequence of the U.S.
approach in the discussions on joint authorship at Creativity That Counts,
the final conference of the HERA funded project Of Authorship and Origi-
nality hosted by the University of Amsterdam in April 2013.
123 See supra, notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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favoured senior contributors that determine the overall plan and scheme
of the work.124  Accordingly, in Aalmuhammed, the effect of the reasoning
in Nottage is altered from how it was understood in the nineteenth cen-
tury: the definition of an “author” as “the person to whom the work owes
its origin and who superintended the whole work, the ‘master mind’” in-
stead “would generally limit authorship to someone at the top of the
screen credits . . . someone who has artistic control.”125  In this way, the
historical research in this paper might suggest ways in which dicta stem-
ming from Nottage could be interpreted differently today, providing a ba-
sis to overcome the bias towards senior collaborators by instead requiring
courts to focus on the process of making the work.
Turning to the implications of this paper for the law in the UK, unlike
the position in the U.S., Levy continues to be drawn on by the courts to
shape the substance of aspects of joint authorship doctrine.126  Ironically,
viewed from a purely doctrinal perspective, this article might support
greater convergence between common law approaches: it provides some
basis for revisiting the role for “intention” in the UK test of joint author-
ship which, as we saw at the outset, is today a key point of divergence
between U.S. and UK approaches.127  Whereas the UK courts today have
interpreted Levy to be authority for the irrelevance of intention to the UK
test of joint authorship, this overlooks that at least one law report of Levy,
that did provide a role for “intention,” a position that was also reflected in
the copyright treatises of that time.128
However, when it comes to explaining the future of UK joint author-
ship law, historical precedents shared by common law countries seem in-
creasingly irrelevant; the increasing influence of regional harmonization
initiatives on copyright policy, such as those in Europe, instead promote
convergence between jurisdictions on a regional basis, spanning countries
of both the common and civil law tradition.129  Indeed, points of conver-
124 See supra, notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
125 Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233.
126 See supra, note 15.
127 See supra, notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
128 See supra, notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
129 Whereas European legislative harmonization regarding joint authorship is con-
fined to aspects of the specific case of cinematographic and audio-visual
works (Article 2(1) of the Term Directive 2006/116/EC and Article 2(2) of
the Rental Directive 2006/115/EC require EU member states to recognise
the “principal director of a cinematographic or audiovisual work” as its au-
thor or one of its co-authors), European jurisprudence has developed a
common approach to the concept of “originality” (see above note 9) which
may well influence, for example, how the UK joint authorship test is to be
interpreted, e.g., the limb relating to the nature of the contribution, which
includes a requirement that this is “significant and original.”  Godfrey v.
Lees, [1995] EMLR 307, 325 (Blackburne, J.).
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gence between common law jurisdictions today often arise despite the re-
gional influences at play, rather than because of shared precedents.130
Accordingly, rather than promoting convergence, the comparative histori-
cal research in this article in fact may go some way to contribute to a way
of thinking that results in further fracture in the common law world, by
raising more fundamental questions about the utility of notions of “tradi-
tions” in structuring thinking about copyright, whether as an explanation
for existing differences between national laws or in setting parameters for
their future direction.131
130 For example, in the late 1990s, while the judiciary in the UK was developing
the criterion requiring a contributor to exercise the “right kind of skill and
labor,” Australian and New Zealand courts were instead focusing on the
need for collaboration, the joint authorship enquiry merely requiring con-
tributors to show they had made a “joint effort” or “input.” See Land
Transp. Safety Auth. of New Zealand v. Glogau, [1999] 1 NZLR 261;
Milwell Pty., Ltd. v. Olympic Amusement Pty., Ltd., (1999) 85 FCR 436,
446-47.  As regards the latter decision, joint authorship was established
merely by showing “joint effort” as part of a “collaborative exercise.”  That
case involved the compilation of words and numbers as prize scales of
poker video games by mathematicians and employees of the respondent (a
manufacturer of video games). Interestingly, the sole UK authority cited by
the Court on the issue of joint authorship was Cala Homes, there being no
reference to UK case law developing the “right kind of skill and labor”
requirement, the decision of Justice Laddie in Fylde decided a year before
Milwell. The greater affinity between the Australian and UK courts’ ap-
proach on this issue today stems from Australian courts responding to the
Australian High Court ruling in Ice TV Pty., Ltd. v. Nine Network Pty., Ltd.,
[2009] HCA 14.
131 For an example of a recent study that places notions of tradition at the heart of
national differences in intellectual property law see TOSHIKO TAKENAKA,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW (2013). The
thesis of this work is that the “two traditions” of common and civil law “still
exert powerful and divergent influences” on national intellectual property
laws. See Preface, at ix.
